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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Secretary begins her memorandum, (Doc. 96 at 11), imagining that there is binding 
authority in her favor and invoking Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 490 
U.S. 477 (1989).  But binding Supreme Court authority holds that the means chosen by Congress 
to regulate how Americans ―pay for . . . health care services,‖ (Id.), are unconstitutional because 
they are tantamount to a federal police power.  As this Court has already noted, ―[n]ever before 
has the Commerce Clause and associated Necessary and Proper Clause been extended this far.‖  
(Doc. 84 at 25).  
Virginia, does not ask ―this Court [to] overturn the Supreme Court‘s current decisions 
recognizing Congressional authority to regulate activities with substantial effects on interstate 
commerce.‖  (Doc. 96 at 11) (citing Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005)).  Virginia cited 
Raich in its Complaint (Doc. 1 at 5, Par. 19) and has relied upon it throughout these proceedings 
to mark the affirmative outer limits of the Commerce Clause: regulation of economic activity 
which is not yet intrastate commerce because there has been no sale, but which nonetheless in 
the aggregate substantially affects the supply of a commodity in interstate commerce.  Raich is 
simply Wickard with this difference:  Raich conceded the facial constitutionality of the statute 
she was attacking.  This was fatal because Wickard does not permit those engaged in economic 
activity affecting the common stock of a commodity to raise an atomized, as applied Commerce 
Clause defense.  Nothing in Raich lends support to the claimed power to command one citizen to 
purchase goods or services from another.  Nor does Virginia ask this Court to ―upend the 
Supreme Court‘s present-day holdings that Congress may adopt measures necessary to ensure 
the effectiveness of a larger regulation of interstate commerce.‖  (Doc. 96 at 12) (citing Raich, 
545 U.S. at 18).  What Virginia does argue is that the means chosen here – the mandate and 
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penalty – are not necessary and proper under the Necessary and Proper Clause because they do 
not simply execute the commerce power.  Instead, if allowed, they would alter the nature of that 
power.  
While it is true that Virginia ―does not dispute that the ACA‘s insurance industry reforms 
– requiring insurers to accept all Americans, including those with pre-existing medical 
conditions, for coverage and barring discrimination in premiums based on health status – are 
well within the Congress‘s commerce power,‖ (Doc. 96 at 12), it has demonstrated that the 
means chosen are unconstitutional because they are without principled limits and are tantamount 
to an exercise of a federal police power.  In arguing that the Supreme Court‘s most recent 
pronouncement on the Necessary and Proper Clause employed a ―deeply historical‖ inquiry, 
Virginia does not ―invent‖ a rule of its own.  Id. The five part test is an ―invention‖ of the 
Supreme Court, not Virginia.  
The notion that United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44-45 (1950), overruled the Child 
Labor Tax Case and creates unbounded regulatory power is easily refuted.  First, the most recent 
authority on which Sanchez relied is Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513-14 (1937), 
which recognizes the continued validity of the Child Labor Tax Case by distinguishing it.  
Second, the penalty here is not a tax, and a regulatory penalty must be supported by an 
enumerated power other than the taxing power.  (Doc. 84 at 27).  Third, the Child Labor Tax 
Case has been cited with approval by the Supreme Court as recently as 1994.  Dep’t. of Rev. of 
Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 779 (1994).  Finally, the Secretary‘s position continues to 
ignore the outer limits of federal power established in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 
618-19 (2000) (―‗We always have rejected readings of the Commerce Clause and the scope of 
federal power that would permit Congress to exercise a police power.‘‖) (citation omitted).  In 
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over one hundred pages of briefing the Secretary has never so much as acknowledged this 
controlling principle, much less joined issue with it.   
Finally, the Secretary‘s argument on facial versus as applied challenges makes a 
distinction without a difference.  All claims that Congress has exceeded its enumerated powers 
are inescapably facial.  Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 743 (2003) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); Rosenkrantz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 1209, 1236, 1276, 
1279 (2010).  See also, United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (no distinction drawn 
between facial and as applied challenges); Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (same).  In any event, the 
analysis this Court has to undertake would not change under either label.  Finally, the Secretary‘s 
premise, that Congress undertook through the mandate to regulate commercial actors as opposed 
to the passively uninsured, is false.  
II. THE EXERCISE OF A CLAIMED POWER THAT IS TANTAMOUNT TO 
A NATIONAL POLICE POWER CANNOT BE SAVED SIMPLY 
BECAUSE IT IS INTEGRAL TO A LARGER REGULATORY SCHEME.  
The Secretary continues to insist that if the unprecedented exercise of an unenumerated 
power (commanding a citizen to purchase goods or services from another) is important to 
making Congress‘s scheme work, it must be constitutional.  Nowhere does she deal with the 
problem that the Supreme Court has never gone beyond permitting the regulation of economic 
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.  Nowhere does she even engage with 
Virginia on the controlling principle in this case:  the Supreme Court always has rejected 
readings of the Commerce Clause and the scope of federal power that would permit Congress to 
exercise a police power.  Nowhere does she deal with the problem that, when a law for carrying 
into execution the Commerce Clause violates principles of state sovereignty, it is not a law 
proper for carrying into execution the Commerce Clause but is instead ―‗merely [an] ac[t] of 
unsurpation‘ which ‗deserves to be treated as such.‘‖  Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 
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923-24 (1997) (citation omitted). Nowhere does she address the fact that the command in 
PPACA is an attempt to exercise a police power.  
With her discussion of United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010) (Doc. 96 at 
20-23), the Secretary loses her footing altogether, accusing the Commonwealth of ―invent[ing]‖ 
the Comstock five part test.  (Id. at 20).  It is true that Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, 
calls the five part test, the ―five considerations‖ which ―[t]aken together‖ support the holding.  
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956.  But Justice Thomas calls it a ―five-factor test,‖ so it is hardly an 
invention of the Commonwealth.  Id. at 1974.  
The Secretary responds to the five part test first by characterizing the traditional dislike of 
compelled transactions, such as forced loans under the Stuarts, as irrelevant ―policy preferences.‖  
It is actually history, an integral part of constitutional adjudication.  Appealing to history herself, 
the Secretary repeats the strange assertion that eminent domain is a compelled transaction rather 
than a taking.  She joins to this a litany of examples of regulation of persons already voluntarily 
engaged in interstate commerce, mischaracterizing them as compelled transactions.  Turning to 
the second and third factors, she calls the lack of any history of federal involvement in compelled 
transactions ―irrelevant‖ even though the second and third factors are defined in terms of 
historical involvement.  130 S. Ct. at 1958, 1961.  The fourth factor focuses on accommodation 
of state interests.  The Secretary states that Virginia‘s interest is accommodated by provisions 
that permit states some flexibility in providing comprehensive coverage.  But Virginia has used 
its police power to establish a right not to buy insurance, and this clear exercise of the police 
power is being invaded by the contrary claims of the federal government.  The fifth factor 
considers whether the links between the enumerated power and the chosen means are attenuated.  
Regulating inactivity to compensate for the federal government‘s execution of its power to 
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regulate the insurance industry could hardly be more attenuated from the Commerce Clause as it 
has heretofore been understood.  Furthermore, and decisively, the five factors involve ―fit‖ 
between the Necessary and Proper Clause and the enumerated power.  That fit is simply 
irrelevant if the exercise is not proper because it violates principles of federalism.  Printz, 521 
U.S. at 923-24.  
III. THE STATUS OF BEING UNINSURED IS NOT AN ACTIVITY 
SUBSTANTIALLY AFFECTING INTERSTATE COMMERCE.  
Beginning with familiar Supreme Court language permitting Congress to ―regulate 
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce,‖ (Doc. 96 at 24) (emphasis added), the 
Secretary continues her trope of calling the status of being uninsured ―activity.‖  (Id. at 24-29).  
No one not engaged in special pleading would ever use the word that way.  The fact that ―no one 
can guarantee that he will not participate‖ in the health care market does not render the 
antecedent condition of being uninsured ―activity.‖  (Id. at 25).  Nor does it matter that the 
uninsured include those who have or will receive health care services, those who have had or 
will obtain insurance, or those who have or will contract for medical services without being able 
to pay for them, as long as what Congress chose to regulate is inactivity.   
The Secretary‘s discussion of boycotts is wrong both in its premises and conclusions.  
(Id. at 27).  It is true that royal colonial governments did not regard non-importation agreements 
as unlawful.  It is also true that modern law permits the regulation of some boycotts.  But not as 
inactivity.  Unlawful boycotts are unlawful because of the combination of the actors—an 
activity.  Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed., at 187 (defining boycott as ―[c]oncerted refusal to do 
business‖), 266 (defining combination as ―[t]he union or association of two or more persons for 
the attainment of some common end.‖)  Of course, none of Congress‘s findings attribute the 
status of being uninsured to boycotts. 
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The Secretary‘s professed confusion concerning the boundaries between economic 
activity and passivity are easily answered.  (Id. at 28).  The difference is between economic 
activity which can be regulated and a police power command to purchase goods or services from 
another citizen.  
The Secretary‘s remaining examples of the supposed regulation of inactivity are inapt.  
As the Commonwealth has previously demonstrated, (Doc. 95 at 31), Superfund liability only 
attaches to an actor in interstate commerce.  While the statement that ―[t]he subjects of the 
numerous insurance-purchase requirements in the United States Code could not exempt 
themselves from those requirements by calling themselves ‗passive,‘‖ is true, (Doc. 96 at 28), it 
is not true for the reason the Secretary imagines.  The reason they could not successfully call 
themselves passive is because they are not.  They are all engaged in voluntary commerce or other 
activities giving rise to jurisdiction to regulate.  
IV. THE SECRETARY’S FACIAL/AS APPLIED ANALYSIS IS CONFUSED 
AND WRONG.  
  The Secretary‘s facial/as applied argument (Doc. 96 at 28-29) fails for the several reasons 
discussed above.  Supra at 3.  It also misses the point in two significant ways.  First, with respect 
to the Commonwealth‘s sovereign injury, there is no other application than the one before the 
Court.  Second, the claim that ―the statute covers individuals who are engaged in economic 
activity,‖ (Doc. 96 at 29), does not matter.  The fact that Congress could have regulated activities 
does not rehabilitate the mandate and penalty, which are unconstitutional because they are a 
forbidden exercise of a police power.  As such, they are unconstitutional in every application 
despite the possibility that Congress could have required actual actors to do something in 
connection with an activity. 
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V. THE MANDATE AND PENALTY CANNOT BE SUSTAINED UNDER 
THE TAXING POWER.  
 The Secretary‘s taxing power argument is now familiar through repetition.  But it is also 
clear that, as with her Commerce Clause argument, it is dependent on idiosyncratic definitions of 
words, on the refusal to join issue with cases or lines of authority that do not support her 
positions, and on anti-historical claims that the federal government has, and has always had, a 
federal police power rooted in the taxing power. 
 Verbal sleight of hand is on display in the second sentence of the taxing power portion of 
the Secretary‘s memorandum where she renames what Congress called a ―penalty‖ a ―tax 
penalty.‖ (Doc. 96 at 29).  Because her formulation is not tethered to, but contradicts, the statute, 
the Secretary takes the only route available to her—she argues that the text is irrelevant and that 
―‗the labels used do not determine the extent of the taxing power.‘‖ (Id. at 30) (quoting, Simmons 
v. United States, 308 F.2d 160, 166 n.21 (4
th
 Cir. 1962)).  However, the Secretary‘s resort to 
Simmons fails for several reasons. 
 The question in Simmons was whether a $25,000 prize for catching a fish had been 
validly taxed. No one disputed that the exaction in question was a tax, so the quoted language 
has been violently wrested from its context.  Unlike Simmons, the threshold tax question in this 
case is whether there is any reason to even address the taxing power and associated cases. 
Contrary to the Secretary‘s reading of Simmons, the Supreme Court has refused to permit 
litigants to denominate as a tax that which Congress has denominated an exercise of commerce 
power.  Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill. v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 58 (1933).  
Even if the Secretary could overcome the fact that Congress chose to explicitly impose a 
penalty and could also overcome the Supreme Court‘s decision in Board of Trustees, her 
argument would still fail.  Her interpretation of Simmons, that ―[t]he substance of the provision[] 
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controls over any labels[,]‖ (Doc. 96 at 30), leads inexorably to the conclusion that the PPACA 
penalty, as a matter of substance, is intrinsically a penalty and not a tax. 
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that ―taxes‖ and ―penalties‖ are 
separate and distinct, stating that ―‗[a] tax is an enforced contribution to provide for the support 
of government; a penalty, as the word is here used, is an exaction imposed by statute as 
punishment for an unlawful act.‘‖  United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 
518 U.S. 213, 224 (1996), (quoting United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 572 (1931)).  As 
the La Franca court held, the word ―tax‖ and the word ―penalty‖   
are not interchangeable, one for the other.  No mere exercise of the art of 
lexicography can alter the essential nature of an act or a thing; and if an exaction 
be clearly a penalty it cannot be converted into a tax by the simple expedient of 
calling it such.  That the exaction here in question is not a true tax, but a penalty 
involving the idea of punishment for infraction of the law is settled . . . . 
 
La Franca, 282 U.S at 572.  To prevail, the Secretary‘s taxing power argument requires that this 
Court ignore Congress‘s express decision to denominate the PPACA penalty a ―penalty‖ and to 
―alter the essential nature‖ of the penalty by ignoring its function so that it can be called a tax. 
Given that the penalty functions as a penalty and not a tax, the Secretary‘s argument, that ―the 
substance of the provision  . . . controls,‖ defeats her own position.   
 The Secretary tries to avoid the Supreme Court‘s consistent view, that, substantively, a 
penalty is an imposition for failing to obey a command of government, by resorting to 
idiosyncratic definitions.  She stakes out the position that unlawful acts are limited to criminal 
violations, so that penalties for violating non-criminal statutes are not penalties at all. (Doc. 96 at 
32-33).  This is simply not the law. 
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 The idea that it is only unlawful to violate criminal statutes as opposed to civil statutes is 
incorrect as a simple matter of definition.  Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, defines 
―unlawful‖ as: 
That which is contrary to, prohibited, or unauthorized by law.  That which is not 
lawful. The acting contrary to, or in defiance of the law; disobeying or 
disregarding the law. Term is equivalent to without excuse or justification. While 
necessarily not implying the element of criminality, it is broad enough to 
include it. 
 
Black’s at 1536 (internal citation and quotation omitted) (emphasis added).  Clearly, ―unlawful‖ 
comprehends the violation of any law, whether civil or criminal.  
This plain-meaning, common-sense definition finds firm support in precedents of the 
Supreme Court.  For instance, in Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 784, a case cited by the Secretary 
(Doc. 96 at 32), the Court explicitly recognizes ―civil penalties‖ as being distinct from ―taxes‖, 
noting that ―tax statutes serve a purpose quite different from civil penalties . . . .‖  Accordingly, 
the Secretary‘s suggested formulation is rejected in one of the very cases she cites. 
Despite having argued that it is substance and not form that should determine whether the 
PPACA penalty is a tax, the Secretary then advances a purely formal argument, asserting that the 
penalty must be a tax because it ―is codified in the Internal Revenue Code in a subtitle labeled 
‗Miscellaneous Excise Taxes.‘‖  (Doc. 96 at 31).  This formalistic argument is not available to 
the Secretary, not simply because it contradicts her prior argument that substance trumps form, 
but because it is foreclosed by both statutory and Supreme Court authority.  A provision of the 
Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 7806(b), provides that ―[n]o inference, implication, or 
presumption of legislative construction shall be drawn or made by reason of the location or 
grouping of any particular section or provision of this title . . . .‖  Furthermore, the United States 
Supreme Court, in finding that an exaction that Congress had denominated a ―tax‖, located in a 
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section of the Internal Revenue Code titled ―Miscellaneous Excise Taxes‖, was actually a penalty 
and not a tax, stated that ―[n]o inference of legislative construction should be drawn from the 
placement of a provision in the Internal Revenue Code.‖  CF&I Fabricators, 518 U.S. at 223.  
Even assuming that the penalty is a tax, it must pass muster under an enumerated power 
other than the taxing power so long as it is being used for regulation.  Child Labor Tax Case, 259 
U.S. 20 (1922).  See also United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936); Linder v. United States, 
268 U.S. 5, 17-18 (1925).  The Secretary suggests that the Court may decline to follow these 
cases, but this Court must refuse the invitation because, as one of the Secertary‘s amici notes, 
―these decisions have not been explicitly overruled . . . .‖  (Doc. 70 at 18).  And the prerogative 
of overruling controlling Supreme Court authority belongs to that Court alone.  Rodriguez de 
Quijas, 490 U.S. at 484. 
In any event, the Secretary‘s argument that the Child Labor Tax Case, Butler, and Linder 
have fallen into desuetude rests on dicta contained in a footnote in Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 
U.S. 725, 741, n. 12 (1974).  The Secretary‘s resort to dicta buried in a footnote simply serves to 
underscore the weakness of her position.  The footnote in question never mentions the Child 
Labor Tax Case (which is mentioned in the body of the case prior to the footnote) nor does it 
mention Butler or Linder, making it impossible to maintain that the footnote overruled those 
cases.  Id.  Second, the footnote, when read in its entirety, reveals itself as pure dicta: 
In support of its argument that this case does not involve a ―tax‖ within the 
meaning of § 7421 (a), petitioner cites such cases as Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 
(1922) (tax on unregulated sales of commodities futures), and Lipke v. Lederer, 
259 U.S. 557 (1922) (tax on unlawful sales of liquor).  It is true that the Court in 
those cases drew what it saw at the time as distinctions between regulatory and 
revenue-raising taxes. But the Court has subsequently abandoned such distinctions.  
E.g., Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937). Even if such 
distinctions have merit, it would not assist petitioner, since its challenge is 
aimed at the imposition of federal income, FICA, and FUTA taxes which 
clearly are intended to raise revenue. 
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Id. (emphasis added).  Finally, a review of the case cited in the footnote, Sonzinsky, reveals that it 
did not overrule the Child Labor Tax Case but instead treated it as binding precedent that had to 
be distinguished.  Specifically, the Sonzinsky court wrote: 
The case is not one where the statute contains regulatory provisions related to a 
purported tax in such a way as has enabled this Court to say in other cases that the 
latter is a penalty resorted to as a means of enforcing the regulations. See Child 
Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 35; Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44; Carter v. Carter 
Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238. 
 
Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 513. Simply put, the Supreme Court has never overruled the basic thrust 
of the Child Labor Tax Case: that a ―purported tax‖ that is actually a penalty to force compliance 
with a regulatory scheme must be tied to an enumerated power other than the taxing power. 
 That these cases are still good law binding on this court should come as no surprise to the 
Secretary.  The Child Labor Tax Case was cited with approval by the Supreme Court in 1994, 
with the Court writing: 
Yet we have also recognized that ―there comes a time in the extension of the 
penalizing features of the so-called tax when it loses its character as such and 
becomes a mere penalty with the characteristics of regulation and punishment.‖ 
Id., at 46 (citing Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 38 (1922)). 
 
Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 779.  Given that the Supreme Court as recently as 1994 cited the Child 
Labor Tax Case for the very proposition for which the Commonwealth offers it, it cannot be 
demonstrated that it is no longer good law.  Not only did the Secretary cite Kurth Ranch herself 
(Doc. 96 at 32), she has also repeatedly cited Butler as valid authority, making her desuetude 
argument even odder.  See, e.g., (Doc. 22 at 47); (Doc. 77 at 25); and (Doc. 91 at 53).  Finally, 
these cases are perfectly consistent with the overarching principle found in Morrison, that the 
Court has “always  . . . rejected readings of . . . the scope of federal power that would permit 
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Congress to exercise a police power.”  Morrison, 529 U.S at 618-19 (bolded emphasis added) 
(internal quotation and citation omitted).   
 Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937), and Knowlton v. Moore, 
178 U.S. 41 (1900), do not aid the Secretary‘s case, but rather, underscore why it fails.  It is true 
that Steward Machine upheld the Social Security tax, but it did so because it was a valid excise 
on a voluntary activity/transaction-- the employment relationship. Steward Machine, 301 U.S. at 
580-581.  Nothing in the opinion suggests that Congress has the power to impose an employment 
excise tax on workers who are not working or on businesses that do not currently exist.  
Similarly, while in Knowlton the Court upheld the estate tax as an excise tax or duty, it was 
upheld not as a tax on a person or even a person‘s death, but rather, as a tax on a commercial 
event-- the transfer of property. Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 78 (estate taxes ―concern the passing of 
property by death, for if there was no property to transmit, there would be nothing upon which 
the tax [could be] levied . . . .‖ ).    
 The Secretary‘s taxing power argument ultimately fails because it is not bounded by any 
principled limits, and therefore, arrogates to the federal government a national police power 
denied to it by the Constitution.  As the Secretary has summarized her position, anything that 
―imposes involuntary pecuniary burdens for a public purpose . . . is an exercise of the taxing 
power. . . ,‖ and therefore, is constitutional.  (Doc. 91 at 56).  This radical position has already 
been rejected by the Supreme Court in Morrison as quoted above. 
VI. THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY IS NOT AN INDISPENSABLE 
PARTY WHOSE ABSENCE PRECLUDES THE COURT FROM 
ENTERING JUDGMENT FOR THE COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 The Secretary‘s insistence that she is entitled to judgment because the Secretary of the 
Treasury is not a defendant serves to underscore her misapprehension of Rule 19 Fed. R. Civ. P. 
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and the relevant case law.  A proper understanding of the law demonstrates that Secretary 
Geithner is neither indispensable nor necessary and that his absence is no impediment to 
judgment being entered for the Commonwealth. 
 First, the Secretary has waived any such objection.  If Secretary Geithner were a 
necessary party under Rule 19(a), her failure to raise the issue when she filed her motion to 
dismiss waived the point.  As then Judge, now Justice, Kennedy wrote in Citibank v. Oxford 
Properties & Finance Ltd., 688 F.2d 1259, 1263 n.4 (9
th
 Cir. 1982), ―[i]n Federal procedure, 
failure to join necessary parties is waived if objection is not made in defendant‘s first responsive 
pleading.‖  The Secretary relegates her response to the waiver argument to a footnote.  (Doc. 96 
at 38, n. 11).  In that footnote, she argues that Citibank does not state the ―law in this circuit‖ and 
that it is contrary to Rule 12 Fed. R. Civ. P.  She is incorrect on both counts.  First, Delta Fin. 
Corp. v. Paul D. Comandaras & Assocs., 973 F.2d 301, 306 n.5 (4
th
 Cir. 1992), recognized 
waiver as a possible disposition but found no waiver– as no party raised waiver as an issue.  
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit held that the remedy was not dismissal with prejudice, but 
rather, ―remand . . . so that the district court may develop the record and determine in the first 
instance whether Cranch indeed must be joined. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a).‖  Id. at 306. 
 The Secretary‘s reliance on Rule 12(h) is similarly misplaced.  Rule 12(h) allows a 
defendant to raise the issue of an indispensable party under Rule 19(b) at any time, up to and 
including trial.  However, whatever the merits of the argument that Secretary Geithner might be 
a necessary party under Rule 19(a), he is clearly not a Rule 19(b) party. 
 To be such a party under Rule 19(b), Secretary Geithner would have to be beyond the 
reach of this Court‘s process or his presence in the suit would have to deprive the Court of 
jurisdiction. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Forst, 777 F. Supp 435, 444 (E.D. Va. 1991) (―The absence of 
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a party from an action can result in dismissal of that action, however, only if such party is not 
subject to service of process, or if the party‘s joinder would destroy the court‘s jurisdiction. Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 19(b).‖).  Clearly, Secretary Geithner is subject to process from this Court and his 
presence would not destroy this Court‘s jurisdiction.  Accordingly, Secretary Geithner cannot be 
a Rule 19(b) party. 
 Assuming that Secretary Geithner were a Rule 19(a) party, the remedy would not be to 
dismiss the case, but for the Court to add him as a party.  Rule 19(a)(2) provides that if the Court 
were to determine that Secretary Geithner is a Rule 19(a) party, ―the court must order that the 
person be made a party.‖  (emphasis added).  See also Orff v. United States, 545 U.S. 596, 602 
(2005) (―Rule 19(a) requires a court to order joinder . . .‖ if it finds a party is a necessary party 
under Rule 19(a)); Forst, 777 F. Supp. at 444.  Thus, if the Secretary were right about Secretary 
Geithner being necessary, she would still be wrong about the remedy. 
 The cases cited by the Secretary are not to the contrary.  Gardner v. Cartman, 880 F.2d 
797 (4
th
 Cir. 1989), dealt with a finding that a federal official who was required by statute to be 
named in the claim was a necessary party and that the claim could no longer be brought against 
him because the statute of limitations had run.  Id. at 798-99.  Neither situation applies to 
Secretary Geithner in this case.  In McCowen v. Jamieson, 724 F.2d 1421 (9
th
 Cir. 1984), the 
Ninth Circuit, finding the Secretary of Agriculture to be a necessary party, reversed the judgment 
of the district court, but remanded ―the case to the district court with directions to add the 
Secretary of Agriculture as a necessary party.‖  Id. at 1424.  Given that a case cited by the 
Secretary finds it is not too late to add a cabinet official after judgment is entered in the district 
court, she is wrong to suggest that this Court lacks the power to do so now.  Accordingly, the 
Court should either find that the Secretary has waived the argument, find that Secretary 
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Geithener is not a necessary party under Rule 19(a), or it must add him as a party under Rule 
19(a)(2). 
VII. THIS COURT SHOULD ADHERE TO ITS PRIOR RULING ON THE 
SECRETARY’S JURISIDICTIONAL ARGUMENTS. 
 In her memorandum, the Secretary argues that she is entitled to judgment because the 
Court ―lacks subject matter jurisdiction‖ over the suit. (Doc. 96 at 38).  She then rehashes the 
same jurisdictional arguments (standing, ripeness and the Anti-Injunction Act) that she made in 
her motion to dismiss. (Id. at 38-39).  The Secretary offers no new arguments to support her 
position and ―recognizes that the Court has ruled to the contrary on these points . . . .‖ (Id. at 39).  
Accordingly, for the reasons stated by the Court in denying the Secretary‘s motion to dismiss, 
the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the suit, and therefore, the Commonwealth is 
entitled to judgment on the Secretary‘s jurisdictional defenses. 
VIII. THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE AND PENALTY ARE NOT 
SEVERABLE FROM THE REMAINDER OF THE ACT, AND 
THEREFORE, PPACA FAILS IN ITS ENTIRETY. 
 In her memorandum, the Secretary makes a significant concession regarding severance.  
She concedes that, if the mandate and penalty are unconstitutional, other ―provisions of the Act 
plainly cannot survive,‖ (Doc. 96 at 41), specifically acknowledging that the ―insurance industry 
reforms‖ contained in PPACA ―cannot be severed from the‖ mandate and penalty, and therefore, 
must be stricken if the mandate and penalty are found to be unconstitutional.  (Id. at 42).  
 However, the Secretary‘s concession is the beginning rather than the end of the severance 
analysis.  A review of the remainder of the Secretary‘s argument on this issue reveals that she 
has misread Virginia‘s position and misapprehended the relevant law.  The Secretary asserts that 
Virginia argues that ―the ACA does not include a severability clause, and in the absence of such 
a clause it must be presumed that the entire Act falls if one provision does.‖ (Id. at 41).  
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Although Virginia has noted the absence of a severability clause, the Secretary has misstated the 
associated argument. 
 The Secretary herself has recognized that PPACA does not contain a severability clause. 
(Id. at 15, Par. 5). From this undisputed fact, Virginia correctly notes that statutes ―containing 
severability clauses are entitled to ‗a presumption that Congress did not intend the validity of the 
statute in question to depend on the validity of the constitutionally offensive provision.‘  Alaska 
Airlines, 480 U.S. at 686.  PPACA does not contain such a clause, and thus, the Secretary is not 
entitled to that presumption.‖  (Doc. 89 at 33).  However, Virginia has not argued that the lack of 
a severability clause is dispositive of the severance question. 
 Virginia has always maintained that severability issues must be resolved based on the test 
set forth in Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678 (1987).  However, the Secretary‘s arguments 
demonstrate that she misreads the Alaska Airlines test.  While the Court made clear in Alaska 
Airlines that ―Congress could not have intended a constitutionally flawed provision to be severed 
from the remainder of the statute if the balance of the legislation is incapable of functioning 
independently. . . [,]‖ id. at 684, such cases only represent a subset of provisions that may not be 
severed.  Alaska Airlines firmly establishes that all provisions of an enactment must be stricken, 
even provisions that are unquestionably legitimate exercises of congressional power, if the entire 
enactment would not have passed without the unconstitutional provision. Specifically, citing a 
long line of cases, the Court wrote: 
―‗Unless it is evident that the Legislature would not have enacted those provisions 
which are within its power, independently of that which is not, the invalid part 
may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law.‘‖ Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1, 108 (1976) (per curiam), quoting Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation 
Comm’n of Oklahoma, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932). Accord: Regan v. Time, Inc., 
468 U.S., at 653; INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S., at 931-932; United States v. Jackson, 
390 U.S. 570, 585 (1968). 
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Id. The Court went on to note that, in determining severance questions, courts should be 
cognizant of the importance of the unconstitutional provisions to the overall ―legislative 
bargain.‖  Id. at 685. 
 In the case of PPACA, it is impossible to credibly maintain that the ―legislative bargain‖ 
struck was not entirely dependent on the mandate and penalty. The tortured legislative process 
that was utilized to enact PPACA resulted in it passing the House by the margin of 219 to 212, a 
fact the Secretary concedes.
1
  (Doc. 96 at 15, Par. 8).  The legislative history reveals an 
awareness that no change could be made in the House because the margin necessary to invoke 
cloture in the Senate had been lost.  Hence, it is as well known as such a thing can ever be 
known, that any change, let alone a major change like the elimination of the mandate and 
penalty, would have caused PPACA to fail.   
Furthermore, the Secretary herself has described the mandate and penalty as the 
―linchpin‖ of PPACA‘s insurance reforms.  (Doc. 22 at 14).  In one of her filings in Florida, the 
Secretary noted that the insurance reforms and the people they would allegedly protect were ―a 
core objective of the Act. . . .‖ as a whole.  Florida v. Sebelius (N.D. Fla.), Case No.: 3:10-cv-
91RV/EMT, available on PACER at Doc. 74 at 29.  Clearly, anything that is a ―core objective 
of‖ PPACA is essential to the ―legislative bargain‖ that produced it. 
 Ironically, one of the examples selected by the Secretary for provisions that could be 
severed from PPACA, abstinence education, drives this point home. (Doc. 96 at 42-43).  It is 
                                                 
1
 The Secretary misapprehends the significance of the narrow margin for passage.  It is true that a 
valid bill that passes by a one-vote margin is still validly passed.  However, when trying to 
determine what portions of a law can be severed from an unconstitutional section, the margin is 
significant in determining whether the remainder of the law would have passed without the 
constitutionally offensive provision.  In this case, any change to PPACA that would have 
changed four ―yeas‖ to ―nays‖ would have defeated the entire bill. 
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simply not credible to maintain that the 219 Democrats, led by Speaker Pelosi, would have 
adopted the abstinence education provisions, or any other noninsurance provision of the bill, as a 
stand-alone measure.  Thus, under Alaska Airlines, it is clear that a finding that the mandate and 
penalty are unconstitutional is fatal to the entirety of PPACA. 
 Even if the Secretary were correct in the assertion that the abstinence education 
provisions (and others like them) could be allowed to stand because they would have passed as 
stand-alone enactments separate from the ―legislative bargain‖ that was PPACA, it is clear from 
the Secretary‘s concession regarding severance that all regulation of health care funding in 
PPACA must fall. Throughout this proceeding, the Secretary has argued that the mandate and 
penalty, like much of PPACA, sought to regulate how citizens ―pay for . . . health care services.‖ 
(Doc. 96 at 11).  She made this point clear at the hearing on her motion to dismiss, arguing that 
Congress decided to comprehensively regulate the way in which health care 
services were paid for . . . . And they did it to all aspects of the industry.  So 
for employers, there are requirements and tax incentives to broaden insurance.  
For the federal government and the state program, Medicaid is expanded to 
increase access for low income individuals. 
July 1, 2010 Tr. at 24, ln. 5-12 (emphasis added).  The secretary reiterates this position in her 
memorandum, linking insurance provisions that she concedes rise and fall with the mandate and 
penalty, (Doc. 96 at 41), with other provisions in PPACA that affect how health care services are 
paid for: 
the ACA regulates economic decisions regarding the way in which health care 
services are paid for. The Act regulates payment for those services through 
employer-sponsored health insurance; through governmental programs such as 
Medicaid; and through insurance sold to individuals or to small groups in the new 
exchanges. The Act also regulates the terms of health insurance policies, ending 
industry practices that have denied insurance to and inflicted burdens on many 
people, most notably the refusal to insure persons because of pre-existing medical 
conditions. 
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(Id. at 17).  Thus, under the Secretary‘s own view of PPACA-- that it is an interlocking set of 
reforms designed to regulate the manner in which Americans pay for health care services-- any 
provisions that deal with paying for health care services cannot be severed from the 
unconstitutional mandate and penalty. Accordingly, any provisions dealing with regulation of the 
private insurance industry, regulation of employers regarding insurance, or changes to Medicare 
and Medicaid must also fall with the mandate and penalty.  However, because it is so clear that 
the entire legislative bargain would have failed without the mandate and penalty, the 
Commonwealth prays that the Court declare that no provision of PPACA is severable from the 
whole.  
IX. THE COMMONWEALTH IS ENTITLED TO AN INJUNCTION. 
 For the reasons stated previously, (Doc. 89 at 38-41), the Commonwealth has satisfied 
the standard for the issuance of an injunction to prevent the Secretary from further implementing 
PPACA.  However, a concession made by the Secretary likely moots the issue.  In her 
memorandum, the Secretary suggests that an injunction is unnecessary because ―a declaratory 
judgment provides adequate relief as against an executive officer, as it will not be presumed that 
that officer will ignore the judgment of the Court . . . .‖ (Doc. 96 at 44-45).  If it is truly the 
Secretary‘s position that the separation of powers dictates that she honor any declaration of 
unconstitutionality by ceasing her efforts to implement PPACA, no formal injunction is 
necessary.  And, in any event, the Secretary‘s concession presumably would apply equally to all 
officials of the Executive Branch who would owe the same deference to such a declaration by the 
judiciary. 
 However, an injunction may still be proper if, as it appears, the Secretary seeks to limit 
her deference to this Court.  Specifically, after stating that a declaration has the effect of an 
injunction because of the deference she owes the judiciary, she tries to limit the concession, 
Case 3:10-cv-00188-HEH   Document 117    Filed 10/04/10   Page 24 of 26
  20 
suggesting that she is only bound by the decision of this Court ―after appellate review is 
exhausted.‖ (Id. at 45). The cases cited by the Secretary certainly do not suggest that Executive 
Branch officials must defer to judgments of the federal courts only after all appeals are final, and 
the Commonwealth is aware of no body of law that holds that the declarations, orders, and 
judgments of this Court are only valid and binding ―after appellate review is exhausted.‖  If it is 
the Secretary‘s position that she will only honor this Court‘s decision after all appeals are final, 
the Commonwealth‘s need for an injunction is evident. 
CONCLUSION 
 Wherefore, for all the reasons stated, the Commonwealth prays the Court to grant its 
motion for summary judgment.           
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